SAML is an open standard that allows separate systems to exchange identity and authentication information. It is commonly used by organisations to give employees secure access to cloud applications through single sign-on. Instead of creating a separate password for every service, users authenticate through a trusted central identity platform.
The term SAML frequently appears when businesses configure applications such as customer-management platforms, collaboration tools, HR systems and administrative portals. A company connects these applications to an identity provider, which confirms the user’s identity. The application then relies on that confirmation rather than handling the organisation’s primary login credentials itself.
SAML authentication involves several technical components, including an identity provider, service provider, authentication request and digitally signed assertion. These components communicate through a user’s web browser using structured XML messages. When everything is configured correctly, the process normally happens within seconds and may be almost invisible to the user.
This guide explains how SAML works, what information a SAML assertion contains and how service provider-initiated and identity provider-initiated sign-ins differ. It also covers SAML metadata, certificates, security risks, common configuration errors and comparisons with OAuth, OpenID Connect, LDAP and other identity technologies.
What Is SAML?
SAML stands for Security Assertion Markup Language. It is an XML-based framework for exchanging authentication, identity attribute and authorisation information between trusted systems. SAML does not store passwords or directly manage user accounts; it provides a standard method for one system to communicate trusted identity claims to another.
The current version used by most enterprise applications is SAML 2.0. It defines the structure of messages, the roles involved and the methods used to exchange information. Although SAML can support several identity-related scenarios, its most familiar use is browser-based single sign-on between an identity provider and a service provider.
A simple example involves an employee opening a cloud-based expense application. The application redirects the employee to the organisation’s identity provider, where the user signs in or uses an existing session. The identity provider then sends a signed SAML response confirming the user’s identity to the expense application.
The application validates the response and creates a local session for the employee. The user gains access without entering a separate application password. This trust relationship is known as identity federation because independently managed systems agree to accept identity information from one another.
Why Was SAML Created?
Before federated identity standards became widely available, organisations often maintained separate user accounts for every business application. Employees had to remember multiple passwords, while administrators manually added, updated and removed access across disconnected systems. This arrangement increased operational work and made consistent security policies difficult to enforce.
SAML created a standard language through which different organisations and applications could exchange identity assertions. A service provider no longer needed to understand how every identity system authenticated users. It only needed to validate SAML messages issued by a trusted identity provider according to the agreed configuration.
This separation allowed businesses to centralise authentication without requiring every application to use the same internal technology. A cloud platform, external supplier and corporate identity directory could participate in one federated relationship. Each system retained its own responsibilities while communicating through a recognised protocol.
SAML became especially important as businesses adopted externally hosted software. Employees needed convenient access to applications outside the traditional company network, but organisations still wanted central control over authentication. SAML SSO allowed these cloud services to rely on the company’s identity provider instead of maintaining completely independent passwords.
Key Components of SAML Authentication
The first major component is the identity provider, commonly abbreviated as IdP. The identity provider authenticates the user and issues a SAML assertion containing identity information. Examples include enterprise identity platforms, federation servers and other systems configured to manage organisational sign-ins.
The second component is the service provider, commonly abbreviated as SP. The service provider is the application or service that the user wants to access. It trusts assertions from the configured identity provider and uses the information inside them to establish an application session.
The third component is the user, who may also be described as the subject or principal. The user normally interacts through a web browser and does not manually transfer SAML messages. Redirects and form submissions move the authentication request and response between the service provider and identity provider.
The final components include SAML requests, responses, assertions, metadata and signing certificates. These elements define what each system expects, where messages should be delivered and how their authenticity should be verified. A successful SAML integration depends on all these values being configured consistently on both sides.
How SAML Authentication Works Step by Step
The process normally begins when a user attempts to open a protected application. The service provider checks whether the browser already has a valid application session. When no session exists, the service provider prepares a SAML authentication request identifying itself and the location where the response should be returned.
The browser carries the authentication request to the identity provider. If the user does not already have an active identity-provider session, the IdP requests authentication. Depending on organisational policy, this may involve a password, passkey, security key, biometric method or multi-factor authentication challenge.
After authentication, the identity provider creates a SAML response containing an assertion about the user. The response may include the user’s identifier, email address, department, group membership or other approved attributes. The IdP signs the response, assertion or both using its private signing key.
The browser posts the response to the service provider’s Assertion Consumer Service URL. The service provider verifies the signature, issuer, audience, timestamps and other security conditions. When validation succeeds, it identifies the user, applies the relevant access rules and creates a local authenticated session.
What Is an Identity Provider?
An identity provider is the trusted system responsible for authenticating users within a SAML federation. It manages or connects to identity records and applies the organisation’s sign-in policies. The service provider does not receive the user’s primary password because authentication occurs at the IdP.
The IdP may connect with an employee directory, cloud identity service or another account database. It can apply central controls such as multi-factor authentication, device checks, location restrictions and risk-based access policies. These protections can then support many connected SAML applications from one management point.
After confirming the user’s identity, the provider creates a SAML assertion. This assertion communicates that authentication occurred and may include selected user attributes. The information shared should be limited to what the service provider genuinely requires for identification and access decisions.
The identity provider signs its messages with a private key. The service provider uses the corresponding public certificate to confirm that the message came from the trusted IdP and was not altered. Protecting signing keys and managing certificate rotation are therefore essential parts of SAML security.
What Is a Service Provider?
A service provider is the website, cloud application or business system that the user wants to access. It relies on the identity provider for authentication but remains responsible for protecting its own application session. The SP must validate every SAML response before granting access.
The service provider is identified by a unique entity ID. It also provides an Assertion Consumer Service URL, commonly called the ACS URL, where the identity provider delivers SAML responses. Some applications offer separate URLs for different environments, regions or customer organisations.
After validating an assertion, the service provider maps the incoming identity to a local user account. It may use the SAML NameID, email address, employee number or another attribute for this mapping. An incorrect mapping rule can create duplicate accounts or grant access to the wrong profile.
The service provider also determines what the authenticated user can do inside the application. SAML may supply roles or group information, but the application enforces its own permissions. Successful authentication does not automatically mean the user should receive unrestricted administrative access.
What Is a SAML Assertion?
A SAML assertion is an XML document containing statements made by the identity provider about a subject. In a common SSO flow, the subject is the user attempting to access an application. The service provider accepts the assertion only when it comes from a trusted and correctly configured issuer.
An authentication statement indicates that the identity provider authenticated the user at a particular time. It can also describe the authentication context, such as whether a password or stronger authentication method was used. The service provider may require a particular level of authentication for sensitive access.
An attribute statement carries information about the user. Common SAML attributes include an email address, given name, surname, department, employee ID, groups or application role. Organisations should avoid sending unnecessary personal information simply because the identity provider has it available.
An authorisation decision statement can express whether a subject is permitted to perform a particular action, although this feature is less common in everyday SAML SSO deployments. Most applications use the assertion for authentication and basic attribute exchange, then apply their own internal authorisation rules.
What Information Is Inside a SAML Response?
A SAML response normally contains an issuer that identifies the identity provider. It may also include a destination showing where the response was intended to be delivered. The service provider should confirm that these values match the trusted configuration rather than accepting any technically valid response.
The response or assertion contains a digital signature created with the identity provider’s private key. The service provider checks this signature using a trusted public certificate. A valid signature helps establish the source and integrity of the message but does not replace validation of its other conditions.
The assertion normally includes a subject identifier through an element called NameID. This value may be an email address, persistent identifier, transient identifier or another agreed format. Both systems must understand how this identifier relates to the application’s user accounts.
Security conditions specify how and when the assertion may be used. These can include an intended audience, recipient, validity period and relationship to an earlier authentication request. The service provider should reject expired, replayed, misdirected or incorrectly issued assertions even when their XML signatures appear valid.
SP-Initiated SAML Authentication
Service provider-initiated authentication begins at the application. A user visits the service provider directly and attempts to open a protected resource. Because no valid session exists, the application generates an authentication request and redirects the browser to the configured identity provider.
The authentication request usually contains the SP entity ID and may specify an Assertion Consumer Service URL. It can also include a request identifier, desired NameID format or authentication-context requirement. Depending on the configuration, the service provider may digitally sign the request.
The identity provider authenticates the user or reuses an active IdP session. It then returns a SAML response that corresponds to the original request. The service provider can compare the response’s InResponseTo value with the request it created, strengthening protection against unsolicited or replayed messages.
SP-initiated SSO is common because users can begin with the exact application or page they want. It also gives the service provider stronger control over the authentication transaction. The application can preserve the intended destination and send the user there after sign-in succeeds.
IdP-Initiated SAML Authentication
Identity provider-initiated authentication begins from the IdP rather than the application. A user signs in to an organisational application portal and selects the desired service. The identity provider generates a SAML response and sends it to the service provider without first receiving an authentication request.
This approach can create a convenient dashboard from which employees open multiple applications. It is frequently used in enterprise portals where the identity provider displays tiles for approved services. Users may access connected applications without visiting each service’s public sign-in page.
The main limitation is that the response is unsolicited. Because the service provider did not create an original authentication request, it cannot validate an InResponseTo relationship in the same way. The implementation must rely carefully on other protections such as signatures, audience restrictions, recipients and short validity periods.
Some modern applications support only SP-initiated SAML because it provides stronger transaction context and more predictable navigation. Others support both methods. Organisations should choose the flow recommended by the application and avoid enabling IdP-initiated access automatically when it is unnecessary.
SAML Bindings and Profiles
A SAML binding defines how protocol messages are transported between systems. The HTTP Redirect binding commonly sends an authentication request from the service provider to the identity provider through the browser. The message is encoded and included within the destination URL.
The HTTP POST binding commonly returns a SAML response from the identity provider to the service provider. The browser receives an HTML form containing the encoded response and submits it to the ACS URL. The user may see only a brief transition page while this process occurs.
The HTTP Artifact binding sends a small reference through the browser instead of carrying the complete assertion. The service provider uses that reference to retrieve the SAML message through a separate back-channel exchange. This approach can reduce browser exposure but requires additional communication between the systems.
A SAML profile combines protocols, assertions and bindings for a particular use case. The Web Browser SSO Profile is the most familiar example. Other profiles support specialised federation scenarios, but they are less common in ordinary cloud-application integrations.
SAML Metadata and Configuration
SAML metadata is an XML document that describes how an identity provider or service provider participates in the federation. It can contain entity IDs, endpoint URLs, supported bindings and public signing certificates. Exchanging metadata reduces manual copying and helps both systems use consistent values.
Identity provider metadata commonly includes the IdP entity ID and SSO service URL. It also includes the public certificate that the service provider uses to verify signatures. Some metadata documents contain more than one certificate during a planned signing-key transition.
Service provider metadata commonly includes the SP entity ID and one or more ACS URLs. It may also identify a Single Logout endpoint or a certificate used to verify signed authentication requests. Applications that support assertion encryption can publish an encryption certificate as well.
Metadata should be obtained through a trusted channel and protected from unauthorised modification. Importing metadata from an unverified location could establish trust with the wrong key or endpoint. Administrators should also plan how metadata changes and certificate renewals will be communicated.
SAML Signing Certificates and Encryption
Digital signatures are central to SAML security. The identity provider signs a response, assertion or both, and the service provider validates that signature against a certificate it already trusts. This process helps detect forged identity claims and unauthorised changes to the signed XML.
A signing certificate has an expiration date, so organisations must monitor it before it becomes invalid. Some identity platforms publish a future certificate in advance, allowing the service provider to trust both keys during rotation. Applications that accept only one certificate may require carefully scheduled manual updates.
Signing protects authenticity and integrity, while encryption protects confidentiality. An encrypted assertion can prevent intermediaries or browser-level tools from reading sensitive attributes. However, encryption creates additional certificate-management responsibilities and does not remove the need for TLS or signature validation.
Administrators should avoid outdated algorithms and unsafe validation behaviour. The service provider should use explicitly trusted certificates rather than accepting keys supplied within an untrusted response. Certificate rollover should be tested in advance so stronger security does not create an avoidable sign-in outage.
Benefits of SAML Authentication
The most visible benefit is single sign-on. Employees can authenticate through one central identity provider and access multiple connected business applications. This reduces repeated password prompts and can improve the experience of moving between approved tools during the working day.
SAML also supports centralised authentication policies. The organisation can apply multi-factor authentication, account lockout, device requirements and risk controls at the identity provider. Individual applications can benefit from these protections without implementing every authentication feature independently.
Password exposure may also be reduced because the service provider does not receive the user’s central password. The application receives a signed identity assertion instead. This reduces the number of systems that must handle primary organisational credentials, although every application still needs strong session security.
Administrative control is another benefit. Disabling a user at the central identity provider can prevent future SAML sign-ins to connected applications. When SAML is combined with suitable provisioning and deprovisioning processes, organisations can improve access management across a large software portfolio.
Limitations of SAML
SAML configuration can be complex because both systems must agree on numerous values. A small difference in entity IDs, ACS URLs, NameID formats or attributes can break authentication. Error messages are often generic, requiring administrators to inspect traces or logs to find the actual mismatch.
The protocol uses XML, which is more verbose and difficult to process than modern JSON-based token formats. Secure XML signature validation also requires specialised libraries and careful configuration. Developers should use mature SAML implementations rather than creating their own parser or signature logic.
SAML is designed mainly for browser-based federation and is less convenient for native mobile applications and modern API architectures. OpenID Connect is often a more natural fit for newly developed web, mobile and API-driven services. Many established enterprise applications continue using SAML successfully.
Single logout can also be inconsistent. Ending the identity-provider session does not always terminate every local session created by connected service providers. Organisations should understand each application’s behaviour instead of assuming that one logout action guarantees immediate removal from all services.
SAML vs OAuth
SAML and OAuth solve different primary problems. SAML is commonly used for federated authentication and enterprise single sign-on. OAuth is an authorisation framework that allows one application to obtain limited access to resources managed by another service without receiving the user’s password.
A SAML assertion might tell a service provider that a particular employee has been authenticated. An OAuth access token might allow an application to read selected calendar data or upload a file on the user’s behalf. The token represents delegated access rather than a general statement that the user signed in.
OAuth alone should not be treated as an authentication protocol. Developers sometimes misuse access tokens as proof of identity without applying an appropriate identity layer. OpenID Connect was created on top of OAuth 2.0 to provide standardised user authentication and identity claims.
The technologies can exist in the same organisation. Employees may use SAML SSO to access an enterprise application, while that application uses OAuth to call an external API. Choosing between them requires understanding whether the immediate need is authentication, delegated authorisation or both.
SAML vs OpenID Connect
SAML and OpenID Connect can both provide federated authentication and single sign-on. SAML uses XML assertions and is deeply established across enterprise software. OpenID Connect uses JSON-based identity tokens and builds on the OAuth 2.0 framework.
OpenID Connect is commonly preferred for new consumer applications, mobile apps, single-page applications and API-centred architectures. Development frameworks often provide direct support for its modern token flows. SAML remains common when integrating existing business applications with enterprise identity providers.
The protocols also use different terminology. In SAML, the main parties are the identity provider and service provider. In OpenID Connect, they are generally called the OpenID Provider and relying party or client, while identity information is carried in an ID token.
Neither protocol is automatically more secure in every deployment. Security depends on the chosen flow, validation rules, key management, session handling and implementation quality. Organisations should prefer the protocol properly supported by the application instead of forcing an unsuitable conversion.
SAML vs LDAP
LDAP is a protocol for accessing and managing information in directory services. It is often used to search user records, check group membership and support authentication against a central directory. SAML is a federation protocol used to exchange identity assertions between separate systems.
An application using LDAP may communicate directly with the organisation’s directory and verify credentials or directory data. This requires network access and creates a closer technical relationship with the directory. A SAML service provider instead redirects authentication to an identity provider and receives a signed response.
LDAP is commonly used inside organisational networks or behind identity platforms. SAML is better suited to browser-based access across organisational and internet boundaries. An identity provider may use LDAP internally to find and authenticate users before issuing SAML assertions to cloud applications.
The technologies are therefore complementary rather than direct replacements. LDAP can support the identity source behind the IdP, while SAML provides the external federation layer. Modern cloud environments often hide this internal directory interaction from the connected service provider.
Does SAML Create and Remove User Accounts?
SAML primarily handles authentication and identity information during sign-in. It does not provide a complete standard for creating, updating, suspending and deleting application accounts. An employee may be blocked at the identity provider while a dormant local account still exists inside the service provider.
Some applications support just-in-time provisioning. When a user signs in successfully for the first time, the application creates a local account from the SAML attributes. This simplifies onboarding but requires accurate attribute mapping and controls over which users are allowed to access the application.
Just-in-time provisioning does not normally provide complete deprovisioning. If a user never signs in again, the application may not receive a message telling it to remove the local account. The disabled identity-provider account can prevent SSO, but API keys, local credentials or existing sessions may require separate action.
SCIM is commonly used alongside SAML to automate user and group lifecycle management. SAML provides authentication, while SCIM provisions, updates and deactivates accounts. Combining both technologies can provide a more complete identity and access management process than either one alone.
SAML Security Best Practices
Service providers should validate the digital signature using a certificate configured from trusted metadata or another controlled source. They should not accept unsigned assertions when signing is expected. They should also reject weak algorithms and avoid trusting keys embedded dynamically inside an unverified SAML response.
Every important condition should be checked. This includes the issuer, audience, destination, recipient, validity period and request relationship. An assertion created for one application should never be accepted by another service merely because both trust the same identity provider.
Replay protection is also necessary. Assertions should have short validity periods, and previously accepted assertion identifiers should not be reused. SP-initiated flows should validate the InResponseTo value so an attacker cannot freely submit an unrelated response to an active session.
TLS should protect the browser and metadata endpoints, while signing keys must be securely stored and rotated. Administrators should limit sensitive attributes, monitor authentication logs and review federation changes. A valid SAML response should never be treated as permission to bypass normal session and authorisation controls.
Common SAML Security Risks
XML signature wrapping is a well-known implementation risk. An attacker manipulates the XML structure so that the signature validates one element while the application processes a different, malicious assertion. Mature libraries and strict reference validation are essential for preventing this class of attack.
Assertion replay occurs when a captured valid response is submitted again. Short expiration periods, one-time identifiers and request correlation can reduce this risk. Encrypting an assertion does not automatically prevent replay because an attacker may resend the complete encrypted message without reading it.
Incorrect audience or recipient validation can allow an assertion intended for one application to be used at another. This problem is particularly dangerous in environments where several service providers trust the same IdP. Every application must confirm that the response was specifically created for its own identifiers and endpoints.
Weak certificate management creates additional exposure. Expired certificates cause outages, while compromised private keys can allow forged assertions. Organisations should protect keys, use modern algorithms, maintain rotation procedures and remove certificates that are no longer intended to establish trust.
Common SAML Configuration Errors
An incorrect ACS URL is one of the most frequent causes of failed sign-ins. The identity provider may send the response to an outdated, misspelled or unapproved endpoint. Some service providers compare the URL exactly, including the protocol, path, capitalisation and trailing characters.
Entity ID mismatches can also stop authentication. The service provider may expect one identifier while the identity provider places another value in the audience field. Entity IDs often resemble URLs, but they function as identifiers and do not always need to open in a browser.
NameID and attribute problems may allow authentication to succeed while account matching fails. The application may expect an email address but receive a username or persistent identifier. Attribute names, formats, capitalisation and value types should match the service provider’s documented requirements.
Certificate errors commonly appear during renewal or migration. The identity provider may sign with a new key that the application does not yet trust. Checking certificate expiration dates, metadata updates and active signing-key selection should be part of routine SAML troubleshooting.
How to Troubleshoot SAML Authentication
Begin by identifying where the flow fails. Determine whether the browser reaches the identity provider, whether authentication succeeds and whether a response returns to the application. This separates identity-provider login problems from response-validation and account-mapping errors.
Review logs on both sides whenever possible. The identity provider may show the application selected, attributes issued and certificate used for signing. The service provider may record a more specific validation error than the generic message displayed in the browser.
A browser-based SAML tracing tool can capture authentication requests and responses for authorised troubleshooting. Sensitive assertions may contain personal or security-related data, so traces should be protected and removed after use. Private keys and passwords should never be included in troubleshooting materials.
Compare the entity ID, ACS URL, issuer, audience, NameID, attributes and certificate with the agreed configuration. Also check timestamps and server clocks because an incorrect system time can make a fresh assertion appear expired or not yet valid.
How to Implement SAML SSO Successfully
Start by documenting the business requirement and identifying the authoritative identity provider. Confirm that the application supports SAML 2.0 and obtain its setup guide. Record the SP entity ID, ACS URL, required NameID format, attributes and supported signing or encryption options.
Exchange metadata through a trusted method and configure both sides in a non-production environment where possible. Use a small test group rather than enabling the integration for every employee immediately. Testing should include authorised access, rejected access and users with missing or unusual attributes.
Plan account provisioning and deprovisioning separately from authentication. Decide whether the application will use pre-created accounts, just-in-time provisioning or SCIM. Confirm what happens to active sessions, local passwords, API keys and ownership of data when an employee leaves.
Before launch, document certificate renewal, emergency rollback and support responsibilities. Monitor sign-in failures after deployment and preserve an alternative administrator access method. A well-designed integration includes operational recovery procedures instead of assuming SAML will never need urgent repair.
Where Is SAML Commonly Used?
SAML is widely used for workforce access to software-as-a-service applications. Employees may use it to open collaboration platforms, customer-management systems, financial tools, learning portals and HR applications. The organisation keeps authentication control while the vendor operates the application.
Educational institutions also use SAML federation. Students and staff can sign in through the institution’s identity provider and access library services, learning systems and research platforms. Federation reduces the need for every external provider to maintain a separate institutional password.
Business-to-business portals can use SAML to accept identities from partner organisations. Each partner authenticates its own employees and sends trusted assertions to the shared service. This model can reduce manual account administration while keeping authentication responsibility with the user’s home organisation.
SAML also supports access to selected on-premises and legacy web applications through identity gateways or application proxies. This can extend modern authentication controls to systems that were not originally designed for cloud identity, although the integration should be tested carefully.
When SAML May Not Be the Best Choice
SAML may not be the ideal protocol for a newly developed mobile application. Browser redirects, XML processing and application-session handling can be more difficult than using a modern OpenID Connect flow designed for mobile and native clients.
It is also not normally the best method for authorising access to APIs. OAuth access tokens are more suitable for representing delegated permissions to protected resources. SAML assertions can be used in specialised token-exchange scenarios, but this introduces complexity that many applications do not require.
Small applications with no enterprise customers may gain little from implementing SAML immediately. The development, testing, certificate management and customer support burden can be substantial. OpenID Connect may offer a simpler starting point when modern identity platforms and frameworks already support it.
However, applications selling to large organisations may need SAML because customers expect compatibility with existing identity systems. The decision should reflect the intended users, integration requirements and application architecture rather than assuming that the newest protocol is always the correct one.
Is SAML Still Relevant?
SAML 2.0 remains widely used for enterprise browser-based single sign-on. Many established cloud platforms and internal business applications support it, and organisations have invested heavily in SAML federation. These deployments will continue operating for the foreseeable future.
OpenID Connect is increasingly common in modern application development, particularly for mobile, consumer and API-driven services. This growth does not automatically make existing SAML integrations obsolete. The two protocols serve overlapping but different application environments and organisational needs.
Businesses should maintain SAML deployments with modern security practices rather than treating them as static legacy configurations. Certificate rotation, strong algorithms, strict assertion validation and current software libraries are necessary. An old integration can become risky when its dependencies and policies are never reviewed.
New applications should evaluate SAML and OpenID Connect according to customer expectations and technical architecture. Supporting both may be appropriate for software sold to varied organisations. The most important goal is to implement the selected protocol securely and operate it reliably.
Final Thoughts
SAML is an XML-based federation standard that allows an identity provider to communicate trusted authentication information to a service provider. It is best known for enabling enterprise single sign-on, allowing users to access multiple applications through one centrally managed identity system.
During a typical SAML authentication flow, the service provider sends the browser to the identity provider. After authentication, the IdP returns a signed assertion to the application’s ACS URL. The service provider validates the message before creating an authenticated application session.
Successful SAML deployment requires more than copying two URLs. Entity IDs, NameID formats, attributes, certificates, timestamps and security conditions must align. Provisioning, deprovisioning and application permissions must also be planned as separate parts of identity management.
When configured carefully, SAML can improve user experience and centralise authentication controls across many business applications. Strong signature validation, short-lived assertions, reliable certificate management and detailed monitoring help ensure that the convenience of SSO does not weaken security.
Frequently Asked Questions
What Is SAML in Simple Terms?
SAML allows one trusted system to confirm a user’s identity to another application. It is commonly used so employees can access several business tools through one central sign-in.
Is SAML the Same as SSO?
No. SSO is the user experience of signing in once to access multiple services. SAML is one of the protocols that can be used to provide that experience.
Does SAML Send Passwords to Applications?
No. The user authenticates with the identity provider, which sends a signed assertion to the service provider. The application does not need to receive the user’s central password.
What Is the Difference Between SAML and OAuth?
SAML is primarily used for federated authentication and enterprise SSO. OAuth is mainly used to grant limited, delegated access to APIs and protected resources.
Is SAML Secure?
SAML can be secure when signatures, audiences, recipients, timestamps and request relationships are validated correctly. Weak libraries, expired certificates or incomplete validation can create serious risks.
